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Differing Cultures, Differing Culpabilities?: A
Sensible Alternative: Using Cultural Circumstances
as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing
DAMIAN W. SIKORA*
A stand-alone cultural defense is a proposed criminal defense that would allow
an immigrant or minority defendant to claim either that he was unaware of the
illegality of his actions in a partcular jurisdiction or that the cultural
environment in which he was raised mandated that he act in a partcular
manner. This note examines the underlying issues surrounding proposed cultural
defenses and analyzes the arguments for and against enacting an official stand-
alone cultural defense. The note concludes that it is against the interests of
fairness and equity to enact a stand-alone cultural defense-proposing instead
that a defendant's cultural circumstances should be allowed to serve as a
mitigating factor in sentencing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situations:
A Chinese immigrant, who came to the United States one year ago, sits down
with his wife to discuss their marital problems. Eventually, the wife breaks down
and admits that she has been unfaithful. In afit of rage, the husband throws his
wife onto the bed and bludgeons her to death with a claw hammer.' He is
subsequently charged with second-degree murder.2
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1 Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American
Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DicK. L. REv. 141,
151 (1994) (detailing the facts of People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989));
Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill
Their Wives, 24 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597, 621-22 (1991) (discussing the facts of
ChenQ
Nancy S. Yim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A
Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 120 (1997); Doriane Lambelet Coleman,
Immigrant Crime and the Cultural Defense, Faculty Forum, (1997) at
http.//www.law.duke.edu/alunmihiews/for97mm.htm; see N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25
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An Iraqi father flees, with his family, to the United States to escape a
tyrannical dictator. After being in the United States for about one year, his two
daughters, who are thirteen and fourteen years old, marry two Iraqi men aged
twenty-eight and thirty-four who have also fled from Iraq. Two weeks after the
marriage, the police arrest the father and mother and charge them with child
abuse and delinquency of a minor. The practice of marrying this young is
customary in Iraq, but it is illegal in Nebraska where the minimum legal age to
many is seventeen.
Both of the above examples have actually occurred. In the first example,
People v. Chen,4 Chen successfully argued that "cultural pressures provoked
Chen into an extreme mental state of 'diminished capacity,' leaving him without
the ability to form the intent necessary for more serious charges of premeditated
murder."5 Chen argued that he should not be held accountable for murder because
in his culture husbands were permitted to take out their shame on their wives.
Because of this defense, the original charge of second-degree murder was reduced
to second-degree manslaughter, resulting in a sentence of five years probation.
The light punishment outraged many, causing a rush of scholarly debate about the
(McKinney 1998).
3 See Margaret Talbot, Baghdad on the Plains, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 11-18, 1997, at 18;
Don Terry, Cultural Tradition and Law Collide in Middle America, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1996,
at A10; Coleman, supra note 2, at http'/www.law.duke.edu/alunmi/news/for971mm.htm. The
mother and father faced a maximum sentence of one year in prison and a $1,000 fine. Nina
Schuyler, When In Rome, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, IN THESE
TIMES File.4 Spatz, supra note 1, at 621 n.169 (citing People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 21, 1989)).
5Kim, supra note 2, at 120.6In this case, the court accepted the argument that Chen was driven to violence by
traditional Chinese values about adultery and the loss of manhood that accompanies it. Daina C.
Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 1053, 1053-54 (1994). To make this point, Burton Pastemack, a cultural
anthropologist, "testified that traditional Chinese values regarding adultery and loss of manhood
made him violent." John Gibeaut, Troubling Translations: Cultural Defense Tactic Raises
Issues of Fairness, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1999, at 93. When asked whether a "normal Chinese person
from Mainland China!' in Chen's position would act differently from an "American,"
Pastemack answered: "In general terms, I think that one could expect a Chinese to react in a
much more volatile, violent way to those circumstances than someone from our own society. I
think there's no doubt about it." Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the
Cultural Defense, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57,65-66 (1994).7 Kim, supra note 2, at 120. The original charge of second-degree murder was a class A-1
felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1998). The minimum period of imprisonment
for a class A-1 felony must not be less than fifteen years or more than twenty-five years. Id.
§ 70.00(3)(a)(i).
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fairness of a cultural defense.8
The second example occurred in Lincoln, Nebraska in November of 1996.9 In
this case, the parents planned to argue that the charges should be dropped because
they were only following the Iraqi custom of arranged marriages and did not
know that they were violating the law.'0 Instead of attempting to use this defense
at trial, the parents pleaded no contest to child neglect charges and were only
sentenced to take "parenting" and "anger control" classes."
These examples show the two sides of the debate over whether to officially
adopt a stand-alone cultural defense. A stand-alone cultural defense is a proposed
criminal defense that would allow an immigrant or minority defendant to claim
either that he was unaware his actions were illegal in a particular jurisdiction or
that the cultural environment under which he was raised mandated that he act the
way he did.' 2 By using this defense, a defendant hopes to have the charges against
him dropped, or at least significantly reduced.
13
The above examples help illustrate how different situations may affect one's
feelings about formally recognizing a cultural defense. Some feel that a formal
stand-alone cultural defense is necessary to protect the individual rights of
immigrants who are new to the culture and are not familiar with accepted norms
in the United States.' 4 These supporters would use the Iraqi example above to
support their viewpoint. Conversely, critics of the cultural defense argue that a
8 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 1; Kim, supra note 2; Alison Dundes Renteln, A
Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
437 (1993); Alexis Jetter, Fear is Legacy of Rife Killing in Chinatown; Battered Asians
Shocked by Husband's Probation, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1989, at 4; Terry, supra note 3. Jetter
discusses the fear that reverberated through the Asian-American community as a result of the
Chen ruling. Jetter, supra. Asian women who were abused by their husbands felt the decision
took away the last bit of protection they had against their abusive spouses because they could no
longer threaten them with "I can take you to court." Id The irony of the situation is that many
of the women came to America to get away from a justice system that favors men, and now
they feel that the Chen decision shows that courts in the United States are just as protective of
men as those in China. Id
9 Terry, supra note 3, at AlO.
1° Schuyler, supra note 3, at 27. There was also an issue in the case as to whether the girls
had consented to the marriages. The police found out about the marriage when the father came
to the girls' school looking for one of the girls after she ran away from her husband a few days
following the marriage. She was later discovered hiding out with her boyfriend. Both girls
testified that they did not consent to the marriage and that their father threatened to ship them
back to Iraq if they did not cooperate. Id.
1 Talbot, supra note 3, at 19.
1 Renteln, supra note 8, at 439.
13See Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the "De
Minimis" Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 64-65 (discussing the impact of culture in the
context of the de minimis offense).
14 Volpp, supra note 6, at 95-96 (arguing for a formalized cultural defense in strategic
contexts to explain the state of mind of immigrant defendants).
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stand-alone cultural defense will unjustly protect defendants from being held
accountable for their actions.1 5 Critics w6uld, and have, used the Chen case to
highlight the negative repercussions of a cultural defense. 6
For many years, the judiciary in the United States has wrestled with issues
related to cultural defenses. 17 Similarly, other countries have also had to grapple
with the issue of how to treat immigrants who violate the law.18 This issue will
only become more important as the globalization of the world continues, and
people from different cultural backgrounds interact with one another more
regularly.19
This note analyzes the underlying issues surrounding cultural defenses. It
concludes that individual justice and equality mandate that cultural circumstances
be recognized only as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of trial, rather
than as a stand-alone defense. Part H defines "cultural defense," discusses who
may employ it, and analyzes its underlying theories. Part m explains the various
"sSee, e.g., Cathy C. Cardillo, Note, Violence Against Chinese Women: Defining the
Cultural Role, 19 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 85, 85 (1994) ('To deny a Chinese man's
accountability by using a 'cultural defense' would make society complicit in the abuse and
serve to deny immigrant Chinese women their equal right to protection under the law.'); Alice
J. Gallin, Note, The Cultural Defense: Undermining the Policies Against Domestic Violence, 35
B.C. L. REv. 723, 743-44 (1994) (noting that a cultural defense undermines the goal of
breaking the cycle of domestic abuse within immigrant families).
16 Goldstein, supra note 1, at 160-61; Spatz, supra note 1, at 621-22.
17 As far back as 1888, courts have dealt with the issue of a cultural defense. E.g., United
States v. Whaley, 37 F. 145, 146 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888) (involving a Native American defendant
charged with murder who had his charged reduced to manslaughter in part because "the Indian
nature, their customs, superstition, and ignorance" showed the defendant had no true malice);
Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist
Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 56-57 (1995)
(discussing early criminal cases where culture was a factor affecting criminal culpability).
18 According to the Toronto Star, in 1994 Canada's federal government examined whether
its criminal code should be amended to allow cultural defenses. Tracey Tyler, Ottawa Eyes
"Culture Defence" Part of Criminal Law Reform Review, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 1994, at
Al. Papers released by Justice Minister Allan Rock suggested that individuals could use such a
defense if their culture allowed marriage to more than one spouse. Id Nevertheless, the
President of the Ontario Criminal Lawyers Association, Bruce Dumo, said that allowing one's
culture to justify "criminal conduct could create 'an impossible situation' because of problems
with determining a certain culture and defining who would be protected under the statute. Id
(quoting Dumo).
An example of a cultural defense case in England was that of a Yoruban mother, an
immigrant from Africa, who "scarred her child's face with a razor to initiate the child into their
tribe." Don J. DeBenedictis, Judges Debate Cultural Defense: Should Crime Acceptable in an
Immigrant's Homeland be Punished?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 28. The mother, on trial for
child abuse, "contended that it would be abuse not to practice the ritual.' Id
19 Coleman, supra note 2, ('The vast number of non-European immigrants who have come
to the United States in the last 30 years (since the reformation of immigration laws in 1965)
leave no doubt that there will continue to be culture clashes.").
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arguments in support of the stand-alone cultural defense. Part IV examines the
problems with stand-alone cultural defenses. Finally, Part V explains why it is in
the interest of fairness and equality to prohibit the use of a stand-alone cultural
defense and instead to allow a defendant's cultural circumstances to serve as a
mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of trial. This part then shows that
recognizing cultural circumstances only as a mitigating factor in sentencing
satisfies most of the rationale for having a stand-alone cultural defense in the trial
stage, while remedying many of the arguments against using the defense in
general. Part V concludes by exploring what would have happened if some actual
defendants had introduced their cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in
sentencing.
II. CULTURAL DEFENSE DEFINED
A cultural defense would allow a minority immigrant defendant to introduce
evidence of his native culture to explain his criminal actions.20 By using the
defense, the defendant hopes to have his charges either reduced or thrown out
because the act he is accused of either carries a lesser sentence or would not even
be considered a crime in his native country.
2 1
There has been much debate regarding the implementation of a stand-alone
cultural defense based upon a defendant's cultural background. It is typically
argued that "[in order to assert [this] defense, the defendant must have been
socialized in a distinctly different culture and this foreign culture must encourage,
or at least sanction, the behavior which has been deemed illegal in this country.
' 22
While no jurisdiction in the United States has officially recognized any type of
stand-alone cultural defense,23 several criminal defendants have been successful at
70 Chi, supra note 6, at 1096.
21 Id. The author states:
The defendant adverts to cultural influences and argues that her native culture would have
excused her conduct, that cultural factors or patterns of behavior are relevant to a determination
of her state of mind at the time of the criminal act, or that cultural factors warrant reduced
charges or punishment.
Id
2Todd Taylor, Note, The Cultural Defense and Its Irrelevancy in Child Protection Law,
17 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 331, 344 (1997).
The rationale for the defense is that an individual's behavior is influenced to such a large extent
by his or her culture that either the individual did not believe his or her actions violated a law, or
that the individual's cultural upbringing compelled him or her to act in violation of a known
law.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
2 Dierdre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of
Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
LJ. 1, 19 (1994) (noting that no formal cultural defense has been recognized although the
16992001]
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introducing evidence of their cultural circumstances, which would be otherwise
inadmissible under the general rules of evidence for that jurisdiction, in order to
have their charges either significantly reduced or dropped altogether.2 4
This note argues that the introduction of cultural evidence at trial must be
limited by the applicable rules of evidence, and any other extenuating cultural
circumstances should be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing. This
note does not suggest that culture can or should be eliminated from a defendant's
trial. A defense attorney is required to put on the best defense possible for his or
her client. To do so, he or she must employ any reasonable defense
strategy-including introducing evidence of a client's cultural background.
Evidence of a defendant's culture has always been, and will always be, used in
trials. There are several instances when this cultural evidence is relevant and
therefore appropriate. One example is when specific intent is an element of a
crime and a defendant's cultural background helps prove or disprove this intent.2s
Some scholars refer to these as volitional behavior cases.26 Child abuse cases
defense has been used as a legal strategy).
24Id. at 20. Many scholars feel that by allowing this information in at trial, courts are
essentially giving these immigrant defendants a "cultural defense." Id. at 19-20. But see Note,
The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1988) [hereinafter
Cultural Defense] (arguing that the current use of cultural factors is not equivalent to a true
cultural defense).
Additionally, many defendants have been able to use the possibility of employing the
defense during plea-bargaining as leverage with prosecutors to have the charges significantly
reduced or even dropped altogether. Margaret Talbot, Making American Law Suit All No Easy
Task, MANICHI DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1997, at 2. "[C]ritics of the cultural defense say that it
has seeped into the justice system in other, subtler ways-for example, by discouraging
prosecutors from filing charges in the first place." Id.
25 JAMES G. CONNELL & RENE L. VALLADAREs, CuLTuRAL IssuES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
§ 7.3 M6, at 7-31 to 7-32 (2000).
James J. Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and
Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1851-53 (1999). "In volitional behavior
cases, the defendant may admit that she willfully or purposely committed the offensive act, but
may raise the cultural defense to demonstrate that she lacked specific culpable intent." Id at
1851. Sing argues two general circumstances in which defendants attempt to assert a cultural
defense: volitional behavior cases and non-volitional cultural claims. Id. Some scholars have
broken this down further and assert there are three different situations in which a defendant can
use a cultural defense. See Sharan K. Suri, A Matter of Principle and Consistency:
Understanding the Battered Woman and Cultural Defenses, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 107,
117-18 (2000). The author states:
A defendant presenting some form of the cultural defense will likely make one of three different
claims. First, he [could] argue that although he committed the [criminal] act... that act was
justified because [it was] not criminal in his own culture. Second, the defendant [could] argue
for a lesser sentence and lesser charge because the crime he committed would [be]
treated... less severe[ly] ... in his own culture.... Third, the defendant [could] argue that the
act he committed was the product of provocation and mental impairment: given his cultural
background, he reasonably perceived and responded to the situation.
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provide a ready example of these crimes, because the defendant must knowingly
commit the crime, with specific intent to do so.
27
One example of volitional behavior is State v. Jones.28 In Jones, a 57-year-old
Inupiat Eskimo man was charged with molesting his son, grandson, and a friend
of the boys because he "swatted" at their fully clothed "crotch areas" and
attempted to pull down their pants while wrestling with them at a birthday party.
29
Jones claimed that his behavior was culturally acceptable as "part of a tradition of
teasing behavior meant to teach young boys to laugh off adversity, protect
themselves from attack and respond quickly."3 The court acquitted Jones "after
experts testified that his behavior was within the bounds of traditional Eskimo
culture and had no erotic intent."3'
Another type of case in which cultural evidence may be relevant is one in
which the defendant claims that some form of diminished capacity led to the
crime. In this type of non-volitional behavior case, a defendant may seek to
introduce cultural evidence to show that she knew a particular action was illegal,
but she was unable to control her actions.32 For instance, in the California case
People v. Kimura,33 a Japanese American woman, after learning of her husband's
affair,34 waded into the Pacific Ocean with her two children and attempted parent-
child suicide.35 While her attempt at suicide was unsuccessful, she did
Id at 117.
27CONNELL& VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.3[b], at 7-32.
21 Id. at n.153 (citing State v. Jones, No. 4FA-S84-2933 (Alaska Super Ct. Jan. 7, 1985)).
29 d.; Sheila Toomey, Eskimo Erotica? Traditional-Conduct Plea Wins Sex-Charge
Acquittal, NAT'L L.J, Feb. 4, 1985, at 6. The incident with the boys, whose ages ranged from
eight to twelve years old, occurred in front of several other people at a party. Id.
3 Toomey, supra 29, at 6.
3 Id. In 1984, the Alaska legislature changed the definition of "sexual contact" to remove
the requirement of specific intent. Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385, 390 n.5 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987). Courts have interpreted this change to mean "specific intent is no longer an element of
sexual abuse of a minor." Boggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).32 Sing, supra note 26, at 1851. "Nonvolitional cultural defenses contest that the actus reus
(voluntary act) component of the crime has been proven." Id.33 Kim, supra note 2, at 117 n.1 11 (citing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985)); see id. at 117-19 (discussing Kimura); Renteln, supra note 8, at
463-64 (discussing Kimura).34 Renteln, supra note 8, at 463.35This practice is known as oya-ko shinju. "[W]hile [it is] illegal in Japan, [it] is not
unheard of as a means by which a family can avoid an otherwise unacceptable social
predicament." Id, See generally Taimie L. Bryant, Oya-Ko Shinju: Death at the Center of the
Heart, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1990) (examining issues surrounding oya-ko shinju);
Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture Is Another's Crime, 9 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COM. L.J. 751 (1987) (discussing oya-ko shinju and its place in the American
legal system); Alison Matsumoto, Comment, A Place for Consideration of Culture in the
American Criminal Justice System: Japanese Law and the Kimura Case, 4 D.C.L. J. INT'L L.
PRAC. 507 (1995) (discussing Japanese law regarding oya-ko shinju).
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successfully drown her two children and was subsequently charged with first-
degree murder.36 A petition with over 25,000 signatures from the Japanese-
American community asked that Kimura not be prosecuted because of her
cultural background.37 As a result she was able to plead guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and be sentenced to only five years probation and psychiatric
counseling.
38
A defendant's culture may also be appropriately introduced at trial in
jurisdictions that have de minimis statutes.39 For example, in Maine v. Kargar,40
an Afghani refugee was convicted of two counts of gross sexual assault for
kissing his son's penis.4 1 On appeal, however, the judgment was vacated in
accordance with Maine's de minimis statute,42 and the trial court was instructed to
dismiss the charges because the defendant had acted in conformity with the
culture of his homeland, had acted with an innocent mind, and the child was not
36 Renteln, supra note 8, at 463. Under California law, Kimura's actions could have been
punishable by the death penalty. Id.37The Japanese-American Community felt that her actions were based upon a different
worldview. Kimura believed that it was worse for a mother to leave her children alone and
unattended in the world than it was to take her children with her to the afterlife. Id. at 463.3 8 Id. She also received one year in the county jail, which she served while waiting for trial.
Id. 39 CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.4, at 7-32 to 7-34. The following four
states currently have such de minimis statutes: Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
Pomorski, supra note 13, at 51 n.2.
40679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996).4 1 CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.4, at 7-33; Nancy A. Wanderer &
Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural
Defense, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 829, 836 (1999). The first count was for a picture in the Kargar
family photo album of Mr. Kargar kissing his nine month old son's penis, while the second
count was for kissing his son's penis six months later while getting him ready for bed.
Wanderer & Connors, supra, at 836. During the de minimis hearing, a professor at the
University of Arizona's Center for Near Eastern Studies, the director of the Afghan Mujahideen
Information Bureau, and several recent Afghani emigrants testified that the act of kissing one's
son's penis is common and acceptable under Islamic law until the child reaches the age of five.
They further testified that there are no sexual feelings involved and that this act is done only to
show that you love the child so much that you are willing to kiss him on what is considered an
unclean and unholy place. Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83 &nn. 2-3.42ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 2000). The statute states:
1. The court may dismiss a prosecution if, upon notice to or motion of the prosecutor and
opportunity to be heard, having regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the nature of the
attendant circumstances, it finds the defendant's conduct:
B. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the
crime or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
C. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the
Legislature in defining the crime.
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harmed.43 The defendant's behavior was consistent with the cultural norms of his
homeland of Afghanistan, so he was found to have lacked the requisite criminal
mental state because he was unaware that such actions were not in conformity
with the laws of the United States.44 In reaching its decision, the court refused to
explicitly recognize a cultural defense and instead used the State's de minimis
statute45 and justified its decision by explaining that "the Legislature did not
envision the extenuating circumstances present in this case.
'
,A6
Because there is no formal stand-alone cultural defense, individual attorneys
and judges have great discretion to choose whether to present or consider cultural
factors that may explain the defendant's behavior.47 This ad hoc consideration of
cultural factors has led to a system that is highly inconsistent in its treatment of
defendants. However, whether a formal cultural defense should be instituted is a
controversial topic with no simple answer. The next two sections will examine the
arguments for and against officially recognizing a cultural defense.
IH. ARGUMENTS FOR CULTURAL DEFENSES
The concept of a stand-alone cultural defense arises from the criminal law
notion that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime that he committed if he
lacks the requisite actus reus or mens rea.4 While the idea of implementing a
cultural defense has incited a great deal of criticism, proponents offer many
arguments supporting it. Although no jurisdiction in the United States has
officially adopted a stand-alone cultural defense,49 in many cases defendants have
still managed to bring in evidence of cultural factors that guided or influenced
their actions.50 Some argue that the volume of cases, in which courts admit
43Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83, 86.
44See Wanderer & Connors, supra note 41, at 842. The court found that there was no real
dispute that Kargar's actions were an "accepted practice in his culture." Kargar, 679 A.2d at 85.
The fact that the victim was not harmed by the act and there was no sexual intent to Kargar's
actions also helped the court reach its decision. Id Perhaps the final piece of information the
court used in making its decision was the harsh penalties, independent of incarceration, that
Kargar would face if convicted. Kargar faced "required registration as a sex offender... and
the possibility of deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C.I] § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)([l 1996)." Id.41 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 2000). In this case, the court believed Kargar
satisfied both of the statutory criteria. See supra note 42 for the statutory criteria.46Kargar, 670 A.2d at 86. The court's decision, however, does seem to recognize Kargar's
cultural circumstances because the court carefully looked at whether his actions were culturally
acceptable and widely practiced in his native land. Id. at 85.47 Volpp, supra note 6, at 57-58.48 Sing, supra note 26, at 1849-50. "The American justice system focuses on the mens rea,
guilty mind, and the actus rea, guilty act, of a defendant in order to determine an appropriate
punishment for a crime." Goldstein, supra note 1, at 156.49 Deborah M. Boulette Taylor, Paying Attention to the Little Man Behind the Curtain:
Destroying the Myth of the Liberal's Dilemma, 50 ME. L. REV. 445, 448 (1998).50
"Cultural defense" is largely a scholarly name put on any defensive strategy wherein a
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cultural evidence at trial to help explain a defendant's actions, show that there is a
legitimate need for the defense.
5 1
The following four arguments are the most prominent among those raised by
proponents of the cultural defense: (1) basic fairness and the principles of
organized justice mandate recognition of a cultural defense; (2) there is a lack of
deterrent value on those who would use the defense; (3) accuracy of cases would
be improved; and (4) public policy in a culturally diverse society dictates that
defendants should be able to assert a cultural defense. The following sections
briefly summarize each argument.
A. Fairness and the Principles ofIndividualized Justice
A foundational principle of the criminal justice system in the United States is
to secure justice for every individual defendant:52 "fairness and equality[] require
the 'tailor[ing of] punishment to fit the degree of the defendant's personal
culpability.' ' 53 For instance, should the Iraqi men who had sexual relations with
the two young girls (from the introductory example) be treated the same way as a
pe'son born and raised in the United States who commits statutory rape? Many
argue that the Iraqi men, having only been in America for a year, did not have the
opportunity to learn or to understand that the act was illegal.54 In situations like
defendant is able to produce evidence of his culture or cultural beliefs to explain or justify his
actions in some way. See Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1293-96. Defendants have been
able to use the cultural defense in cases involving crimes such as "rape, child
molestation ... and violence connected with spousal infidelity." Sing, supra note 26, at 1848;
see, e.g., Maine v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 83 (Me. 1996) (finding culture to be a relevant factor in
applying the de minimis statute to charges of child molestation); People v. Aphaylath, 502
N.E.2d 998, 999 (N.Y. 1986) (asserting that defendant's culture affected his loss of self control
when he observed his wife showing affection for another man); People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr.
868, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (arguing that defendant's culture affected her state of mind vhen
she strangled her son and attempted to kill herself).
5 See Sing, supra note 26, at 1848.
52Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1298. "One of the main arguments in favor of
establishing a formal cultural defense is that it is a necessity insofar as the American legal
system tries to provide individualized justice." CONNELL & VALIDARES, supra note 25, § 7.7,
at 7-42.53 Chiu, supra note 6, at 1097 (quoting Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1298).
Professor Placido Gomez feels "[p]unishment is only justified when (1) the action is morally
condemnable, and (2) the actor is culpable." Placido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference:
Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 357, 361 (1994).54 See Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1299. The author states:
It may be fair to impute knowledge of American law to persons raised in this country various
socializing institutions such as the family, school, and place of worship can reasonably be
expected to have instructed these persons about the norms upon which society's laws are based.
A new immigrant, however, has not been given the same opportunity to absorb-through
exposure to important socializing institutions-the norms underlying this nation's criminal
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this, a cultural defense may be required to ensure individualized justice because,
without the defense, an immigrant may be undeservedly punished.
Some scholars have proposed that having an official cultural defense would
further the criminal justice system's goals of ensuring individualized justice and
assessing moral blameworthiness, enabling courts to better understand the
individual defendant's situationi 5 Additionally, some commentators worry that
prosecuting immigrant defendants for crimes stemming from their cultural beliefs
"endanger[s] the[ir] ... individuality and cultural heritage. 56 The idea is that
"immigrant cultures offer... valuable elements to enrich national life
generally ' 57 and that "respect for the individual and his personal beliefs is an
integral part of human rights."" Some immigrants may commit a crime out of a
sense of moral obligation, based on the norms of their former cultural
environment.5 9 In these situations, an official cultural defense would permit courts
to look at factors motivating the defendant's actions that might not otherwise be
admissible. The courts could then decide whether these factors limit the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant, thereby necessitating conviction of a lesser
charge.
60
Finally, some supporters feel that a cultural defense is required to put
immigrant defendants on an equal level with non-immigrant defendants.6 1 They
believe that laws in the United States are "based on 'Eurocentric values' [and
that] members of minority cultural groups might need to use cultural evidence in
court in order to be treated on the same footing as members of the dominant
culture. 6
2
B. Punishing Those Who Could Use the Cultural Defense Would Fail to
Deter.
Many advocates of the cultural defense claim that deterrence, a primary
laws.
Id. 55 Goldstein, supra note 1, at 157-58.56 Julia P. Sams, Note, The Availability of the "Cultural Defense" as an Excuse for
Criminal Behavior, 16 GA. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 335,350 (1986).
571d.
581d.
59 Goldstein, supra note 1, at 157.
6Id. (explaining an argument voiced by proponents of a cultural defense that "the goal of
moral blameworthiness in the American legal system would be recognized in conjunction with
a cultural defense").61Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 23, at 34-35; Valerie L. Sacks, Note, An
Indefensible Defense: On the Misuse of Culture in Criminal Law, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
523, 530 (1996).62Sacks, supra note 61, at 530.
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purpose of punishment would not be eliminated when defendants either have
their charges dropped or their sentences reduced through the use of a cultural
defense. 63 First, they argue that the majority of situations in which a cultural
defense would be used arise infrequently, with fact patterns that are unlikely to
reoccur, thereby rendering the deterrent value of punishment useless.64 For
example, in the Chen case, Chen was not a serial murderer and his reaction posed
no threat to anyone other than his wife. In addition, in the situations where the
culturally related crimes are motivated by a moral or social compulsion, the threat
of punishment, no matter how severe, will be ineffective as a deterrent 65 This is
especially true in cases like Kimura, where the defendant murdered her children
and fully intended to commit suicide.66 Regardless of the punishment, her moral
and social compulsion to kill her children, to prevent them from being left alone
after she killed herself, would have dominated.67
C. Instituting a Cultural Defense Would Improve the Accuracy of Cases
Some who support instituting a formal cultural defense believe that it will
lead to discovery of a more accurate account of the events that led to the charges
63 See id, at 532. On the other hand, some feel that adopting an official cultural defense will
remove any incentive for immigrant groups to quickly learn the laws of their new country. They
feel that this will lead to confusion about what constitutes criminal conduct, eventually causing
respect for the law to decay to a point where "persons who abide by the laws will suffer at the
hands of those who do not." Sams, supra note 56, at 348; see also Goldstein, supra note 1, at
160 (arguing that prosecuting and punishing the defendants involved in a culturally motivated
crime would deter the community from repeating the defendarit's actions). Others feel,
however, that this fear that all social order will decay as a result of a cultural defense is
unjustified because there are several other defenses available to defendants and they have not
led to any loss of social order. Sacks, supra note 61, at 532. Additionally, deterrence maybe an
insignificant factor because "situations in which this arises are often 'triggered by extraordinary
circumstances unlikely to recur."' Id. (quoting Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1303); see
also Chiu, supra note 6, at 1107-08; Andrew M. Kanter, The Yenaldlooshi in Court and the
Killing of a Witch: The Case for an Indian Cultural Defense, 4 S. CAL INTERDISc. L.J. 411,426
(1995) (stating that "enforcing criminal law merely for uniform applicability, without fulfilling
any legitimate goals of punishment, [i.e. deterrent value,] offers little moral weight and dubious
effectiveness").
4 Sacks, supra note 61, at 532. This reasoning may be flawed, however, because it
seemingly rewards defendants who have killed as compared to those who have harmed or
attempted to harm a victim. For example, if a husband abused his wife, he might be more likely
to do it again because the same circumstances could arise again. Conversely, had he killed his
wife, he certainly could not harm her again, and even if he remarried, it is unlikely that the same
circumstances would arise that led him to murdering his first wife.65Id. at 532 n.63.
66 Matsumoto, supra note 35, at 523 (detailing the facts of the Kimura case).
67 Additionally, punishment will not effectively deter anyone who is prepared to take her
own life because that individual will not even consider the repercussions of her actions.
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being filed.68 Those who commit crimes that could be covered by a formal
cultural defense often must resort to justifying their actions by using defenses that
are currently permitted, even though those defenses may not fit their specific
circumstances. 69 For example, some immigrant defendants have tried to use the
insanity defense to justify their actions, though they are sane.70 "However,
differing cultural practices cannot be equated to mental illness." ' Forcing a
cultural defense into another defense requires the defendant to prove his actions
were something different than what they actually were. Additionally, an argument
could be raised that this type of creative defense is inappropriate for an immigrant
defendant, who has committed a crime because of her cultural circumstances,
because she will be adjudged deranged by the United States justice system.
D. Public Policy
Public policy interests may justify acceptance of a stand-alone cultural
defense. An official cultural defense is necessary to guarantee that cultural
evidence is handled fairly in court.72 One defendant may be allowed to bring in
evidence of his cultural background simply because a judge is more open to the
defense and willing to slightly bend the rules of evidence. But another defendant,
in a similar situation, may not be permitted to bring in cultural evidence because
his judge is opposed to allowing such evidence in at trial.73 The inconsistencies in
judges' feelings towards recognizing cultural factors make it impossible, in the
present process, for different defendants in similar situations to be treated
similarly.74
Some also argue that by not creating a stand-alone cultural defense, courts are
68 See Sacks, supra note 61, at 530-32.
691d. Contrary to this idea, some scholars feel that accuracy will not be improved. Instead,
they feel it will be made worse because an official cultural defense will cause defendants to try
to force themselves into a certain culture in an effort to take advantage of the defense. Id. at
538-40.70 See Bui v. State, 551 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). The Vietnamese defendant
was accused of murdering his children after leaming of his wife's affair. Id. at 1099. His
attomey tried to use the insanity defense to introduce evidence that in the Vietnamese culture, if
a marital partner is unfaithful, it is not uncommon for the other to commit acts of violence as a
"face saving measure." Id at 1101-02; see also Maguigan, supra note 17, at 72.71 Chiu, supra note 6, at 1106. Furthermore, even if the defendant escapes conviction with
the insanity defense, she has been proven insane and is subjected to possibly indefinite civil
commitment, and "[s]uch punishment is completely inappropriate and unrelated to the nature of
a cultural crime." Id
7 2 CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.7, at 7-42 to 7-43. Under the current
practice, judges are inconsistent regarding whether to allow evidence of a cultural defense. Id.;
Suri, supra note 26, at 124.73 CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.7, at 7-42 to 7-43.74See id.
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trying to force immigrants to assimilate into American culture.75 This forced
assimilation goes against the American ideal that cultural pluralism should be
encouraged and that America is a place where people from all over the world can
come, and their differences will be accepted and embraced.
76
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CULTURAL DEFENSES
While there are many who support officially adopting a cultural defense for
the trial phase,77 there are several legitimate arguments levied in opposition to the
defense. The most common arguments against cultural defenses include: cultural
defenses may promote stereotypes; immigrant women and children's rights are
undermined by the defense; it would be impossible to draft legislation that defines
when, where, and how the defense can be used; and the defense would cause a
balkanization of the criminal justice system. The remainder of this section
explores some of these arguments.
A. Cultural Defenses Promote Stereotypes
Many opponents believe that a cultural defense promotes negative
stereotyping of minorities and immigrants because it assumes that the culture of a
particular area is easily identifiable and that all people from that area will act
similarly.78 It is impossible to generally define any culture.79 For example, if one
were to try to define American culture, which cultural climate would be most
representative-metropolitan New York or a sleepy farming community such as
Lodi, Ohio? If it is very difficult to define American culture, it would be almost
impossible for our courts to attempt to define the cultures of other countries.
There have been several cases in which Japanese women have killed or
attempted to kill their children, through the Japanese practice of oya-ko shinju,
after learning of their husband's infidelity.80 Perhaps the most notorious of these
was the Kimura8' case in which the mother who drowned her children was given
a sentence of only five years probation.8z Though it may not have intended to do
so, the court's decision may have sent the message that in the American legal
75Id.; see Chiu, supra note 6, at 1085-86 (explaining the coerciveness and dominance of
this assimilation).
76 See CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.7, at 7-43.
77 See supra Part III.78 Suri, supra note 26, at 123.
79Id
80E.g., Kim, supra note 2, at 117-19 (discussing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los
Angeles Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985)).
"' Id.; see supra notes 33-38.82Renteln, supra note 8, at 463.
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system immigrant Japanese children are not valued as much as American
children. 3 In addition, some may view such decisions as a statement by the courts
that they view Japanese women as less stable than American women and, as a
result, courts are adopting different standards of acceptable conduct for Japanese
women.8 4 Many believe that our criminal justice system should not promote either
of these ideas. 5
In addition to potentially stereotyping the minority defendant's cultural
background, stereotypes of a minority culture encourage inaccurate stereotypes of
the majority culture. 6 In other words, by comparing the culture of an immigrant
defendant to the culture of the United States, the court is forced to make some
stereotypical judgments about what does or does not fit within American culture.
B. Cultural Defenses Undermine the Rights of Women and Children
One of the greatest criticisms against recognizing a formal cultural defense is
that women and children (often the victims) suffer in place of the defendants
excused by the defense.87 While American law and society generally respect and
value women and children, this is not the case in other countries.88 If there was a
stand-alone cultural defense available for use by a defendant charged with
injuring or killing his wife or children, the cultural defense might work to
condone family violence, an action typically condemned by American society. 9
When used in these circumstances, the lasting effect of the defense is to create
among women and children in immigrant communities the feeling that they have
no recourse against their abusive relatives.90
Following People v. Chen, where the defendant was given only five years of
probation for the murder of his wife, both Asian and women's groups challenged
8 3See Volpp, supra note 6, at 76 (explaining how the outcome of the Chen case sent the
message that "Jian Wan Chen's life was... worth less than other lives").
14 See Chiu, supra note 6, at 1085-86 (discussing the stereotyping of Asian women and
how it represents an example of forced white assimilation).85Renteln, supra note 8, at 498-99 ("Some may object to a formal cultural defense on the
grounds that putting the culture on trial may have adverse consequences for members of the
group. There is concern that decisions based on group characteristics may lead to the
reinforcement of social stereotypes.").86 1d.
17 See supra note 86.
Is See Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from the
Battered Women's Movement and the Asign American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 168-69
(explaining how many Asian communities strongly value the family group and often treat
women as subordinates).
'9 Gallin, supra note 15, at 735-36; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 162 ("[A] recognition of the
cultural defense would demonstrate that the United States tacitly consents to the violence
toward women that is practiced throughout the world.").
901d.; Volpp, supra note 6, at 77.
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the decision, "saying it endangered women in general and immigrant women in
particular."9' A feeling of confusion and fear swept through the immigrant Asian
women community.92 Asian immigrant women are "[t]raditionally reticent about
airing family problems, and forced by U.S. immigration laws to stay with their
abusive spouses," so they feel trapped.93 As a result of the Chen decision, these
women feel as unprotected under American law as they did under Chinese law.94
In Kimura,95 a Japanese-American woman drowned her two children in the
ocean, the two children suffered more than the defendant, who was only
sentenced to five years probation and psychiatric counseling.96 Critics of the
implementation of a stand-alone cultural defense feel that it would prevent the
defenseless from obtaining the protections of the legal system.97 Additionally,
critics argue that "permitting the use of culture-conscious, discriminatory
91Jetter, supra note 8, at 4. But see Talbot, supra note 24, at 2 (noting that the Chen verdict
angered many women's groups, but had the support of Margaret Fung, the head of the Asian-
American Defense and Education Fund).
9 2 0ne woman who read about the Chen case in a Chinese language newspaper
immediately gathered her children and went to a shelter because she "was afraid her husband
would read about the case." Jetter, supra note 8, at 4.
93 d. Many Asian women who have immigrated to the United States are sponsored by
husbands who came here several years earlier to find work. These women are at a disadvantage
because they often cannot speak English, and U.S. immigration law mandates that those who
have not been married to their husbands for two years remain living -with their husbands or face
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1186(b)(1998). The Code of Federal Regulations provides an exception
to the two-year requirement for women who are "battered" or "subject to extreme cruelty" by
their spouses. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(iii)(2001). Unfortunately, many immigrant women may not be
aware of this exception, and even if they are aware of it, the language barrier and economic
factors may prevent them from gathering the evidence required to invoke the exception. In the
face of these two obstacles, many of these abused women are almost defenseless because they
feel that their power to protect themselves (by threatening to report their husbands) is gone. One
restaurant cashier in New York's Chinatown, who spoke through an interpreter, commented, if
a husband who murders his wife only gets five years probation, "what if you only get hit or
beaten?" Jetter, supra note 8, at 4.
94 Jetter, supra note 8, at 4. Some critics say that the Chinese court system may have dealt
more harshly with Chen than did the United States court system. Cf Dick Polman, After a
Killer Eludes Jail, a 'Cultural Defense'Is on Trial, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, July 2, 1989, at 1-A
("Under the feudal system, misuse of a spouse may have been acceptable. But now in China,
you can be prosecuted.").
95See supra notes 80-81. For a discussion of Kimura, see Kim, supra note 2, at 117-19
and Renteln, supra note 8, at 463-64.96Renteln, supra note 8, at 463. Kimura also received one year in the county jail, which
she served while waiting for trial. Id
97See DeBenedictis, supra note 18, at 28. DeBenedictis interviewed a proponent of the
cultural defense, Alison Dundes Renteln, and "even she was troubled by how the defense might
protect those who commit crimes against women and children." Id. Al Giannini, a deputy
district attomey from San Francisco, has argued that many foreign women and children come to
the United States 'Just to escape maltreatment permitted in their homeland." Id. This shows the
true irony of trying to protect immigrant groups by giving them a cultural defense.
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evidence as part of the defendant's case-in-chief distorts the substantive criminal
law and affords little or no protection to victims, whose assailants are left, as a
result of this distortion, relatively free from broader societal strictures."98
C. Implementation of a Bright Line Rule for Cultural Defenses Would be
Impossible
Many opponents of establishing a stand-alone cultural defense for use during
the trial phase feel there are no bright line rules that can be implemented to ensure
that the cultural defenses can be fairly applied.99 The legal system would face an
impossible task of formulating rules if a formal cultural defense were to be
recognized in the trial phase.'00
The first, and possibly greatest, problem of instituting a cultural defense is
determining what constitutes a cultural norm for a certain area or country. Many
scholars believe that there is no uniform definition of a certain culture and that
even if one could define a culture at one time, cultures are constantly changing.' 0 '
Another thing to consider is whether subcultures should be recognized under
the defense 0 2 For instance, one commentator has argued that African-
Americans, a minority in America, should sometimes be exempted from the full
weight of the law.'03 Another has argued that "a cultural defense should be just as
available to American Indians as to modem immigrants from the Third
World."' 4 The problem with allowing subcultures to use the defense is that
98Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1996).
99See Maguigan, supra note 17, at 44-45 ('There is not and will not be a separate cultural
defense because as a practical matter such a defense can be neither defined nor
implemented.... [D]ebate over a new cultural defense is misguided because... a workable
legal definition of culture is impossible to develop.").
100 Sams, supra note 56, at 345. Sams believes that the problems of deciding which groups
may use the cultural defense can be divided into two stages:
The first stage involves the burden of separating the group of bona fide foreign newcomers from
other cultural minority groups who may try to abuse the protection that the defense
offers.... [Tihe second stage of problems involves the dilemma of separating the individual
defendants who may legitimately assert the defense from those who are sufficiently
'enculturated' to be held responsible for their actions.
Id.
101Maguigan, supra note 17, at 52 ('The issue of simply defining 'culture' and its
relationship to criminal justice has long engaged the attention of anthropological scholars, one
of whom suggests that it may be impossible, and it is difficult to imagine the criminal justice
system doing a better job."); Suri, supra note 26, at 123.
'
02See DeBenedictis, supra note 18, at 28-29. Giannini feels that "[a]n official cultural
defense could expand to protect members of cults or gangs." Id. at 29.
'o3Talbot, supra note 24, at 2.
104 DeBenedictis, supra note 18, at 29. William A. Thom Jr., a trial court judge from Utah
17112001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
"people might claim to belong to a certain group, or even join one, in order to
claim the benefit of the defense."' 0 5
Another difficulty stemming from acceptance of a stand-alone cultural
defense is that legislatures would be forced to decide whether immigrants should
only have the defense available to them for a limited amount of time after arriving
in the United States.10 6 Deciding how long to allow the defense for a particular
defendant would be arbitrary, but allowing it indefinitely is dangerous because at
some point the immigrant will become familiar with American laws but will still
be able to use the defense. Similarly, difficulty surrounds the circumstances in
which an individual has been in the country for a number of years but has been
isolated from mainstream American culture.'07 The Kimura case raised this
inquiry because Kimura had lived in the United States for fourteen years before
she drowned her children.' 8 The length of time that she resided in America raised
questions about whether she was legitimately ignorant about American laws.'0 9
The cultural defense "would [essentially] establish separate standards for
different groups" of people.o Opponents feel that this "would lead to anarchy as
and a Porno Indian who spent several years as a tribal judge for several western American
Indian reservations, feels that the American Indian cultural beliefs should be protected just as
much as those of recent immigrants to the United States. Id.
'o5Sams, supra note 56, at 346. As far back as 1982, defendants have wrongfully tried to
seek shelter through the cultural defense. Id. Sams references the case, People v. Rhines, 182
Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), as an example. Sams, supra note 56, at 346. In Rhines, an
African-American defendant was charged with raping an Afirican-American female. Rhines,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80. The defendant contended that he reasonably believed that the victim
consented and "that she thought nothing of his loud voice because it is a common characteristic
of black people to talk loud to each other." Id. at 483. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce
the testimony of a psychologist to the effect that black people customarily speak very loudly to
each other. Id.
106 CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.7, at 7-43. "If a cultural defense were to
be implemented, questions would arise as to whether there would be a time limit for its use,
whether only the newly arrived could invoke it and not members of second and third
generations, and whether subcultures could raise it." Id. Additional questions would arise
regarding whether the cultural defense should only apply to immigrants who have recently
arrived or whether it should apply to those who have been in the United States for a number of
years, but have for some reason been isolated from the outside. See DeBenedictis, supra note
18, at 29 (discussing the comments of Joan Dempsey Klein, an appellate judge in Los Angeles);
Sams, supra note 56, at 347 ('he courts must establish a termination point after which a
defendant is considered to be enculturated.").
'
07 Sams, supra note 56, at 347. The circumstances of each case are unique; therefore, "the
courts must make a separate inquiry into each defendant's opportunity for orientation. One
person may learn about American culture and legal standards within a few weeks, while
another may remain ignorant for years." Id.
1081d.
109 Id. It seems there should be a direct correlation between the length of time one has lived
in a country and the ignorance one can claim regarding that country's laws.
"
0 CONNELL& VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.7, at 7-43.
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each group would decide for itself with which standards it would comply [and
this] would undermine the deterrent effect of the law.""' "[O]fficial recognition
of a cultural defense would have the 'pernicious effect of creating different laws
for different people."'
' 12
D. Potential Balkanization of the Criminal Justice System
Some commentators have argued that officially adopting a cultural defense
for the trial phase is essentially risdng the balkanization of criminal law." 3 By
this, they mean that minority immigrant defendants would be subject to an
entirely different set of laws than all other American non-minority defendants
because they would essentially be permitted to use ignorance as an excuse in
crimes involving cultural factors." 4 And, as Duke Law Professor Doriane
Lambelet Coleman noted, "[t]his is a prospect that is inconsistent not only with
one of the law's most fundamental objectives, the protection of society and all its
members from harm, but also with the important human and civil rights doctrines
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.""' Allowing the "reasonable person"
to be interpreted in a specific cultural way violates the equal protection clause.16
Additionally, it adds to the perception that immigrants living in America are still
"foreigners" and that they are not included in the definition of an "American."'
17
A potential side affect of this balkanization may be that jury nullification will
occur more frequently. "Jury nullification has been defined by one scholar as
'voting to acquit a defendant despite a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that,
based on the proper evidence, the defendant is guilty of the crime with which he
is charged."'' ' 8 The risk is that a predominantly non-minority jury may choose
not to convict non-immigrant defendants because of potential inequity. For
"l Id.
112 Kanter, supra note 63, at 425 (quoting DeBenedictis, supra note 18, at 29).
113 Coleman, supra note 99, at 1098.
1l4Id.
"
5 Id.; Talbot, supra note 3, at 18. Coleman has also said that this violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise to protect the rights of all criminal defendants equally. Sing, supra note
26, at 1848.
116 But see CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.6[b], at 7-40 (arguing that
"failure to allow culturally specific interpretations of the reasonable person" is "a violation of
equal protection" because "[j]udicial adherence to objective standards effectively prevents
defendants from other cultures from using existing criminal law defenses such as provocation
and mistake of fact as to consent").
"17 See Volpp, supra note 6, at 66. Volpp argues that "the perspective that Chinese living in
the United States are not 'American' is the very basis for the assertion of the 'cultural defense,'
on the grounds that someone from a distinctly 'non-American' culture should not be judged by
'American' standards." Id.
".Taryn A. Merkl, Note, The Federalism of Criminal Law and Double Jeopardy, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175, 192 n.84 (1999) (quoting RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE CRIME
AND THE LAW 295 (1997)).
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instance, if the jury was aware that a minority defendant who had been tried for
the same crime had been given a very light sentence through a stand-alone
cultural defense, it may choose not to convict a non-immigrant defendant to
prevent him from receiving a tougher sentence." 9
The criminal justice system should be centered on fairness to all
defendants . 20 Allowing a defense that may only be used by a limited group of
defendants does not ensure fairness. Furthermore, it is argued that the official
recognition of a cultural defense would promote and perpetuate a view that
immigrants and minorities get preferential treatment that non-minorities do not
receive.121
V. CULTURAL DEFENSES SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY IN THE SENTENCING
STAGE AS A MITIGATING FACTOR
Because both proponents and opponents of the cultural defense have
legitimate arguments, it is clear that some alternative is required to resolve the
problem. The current system, in which there is no formal cultural defense, but in
which some judges randomly admit the normally inadmissible evidence of a
defendant's cultural background, is unacceptable.122 To ensure fairness to
victims1 23 and to minimize inconsistent rulings in which different defendants who
commit the same crime are punished differently, 24 cultural issues, other than
those permitted by the rules of evidence, should be taken into account only in the
sentencing phase of a criminal trial. 25 After the defendant is found guilty, the
"' This could potentially set the judicial system back to the Jim Crow days, where jury
nullification was rampant simply because of the defendant's race.
120 Goldstein, supra note 1, at 161.
21 Suri, supra note 26, at 122.
122See id at 124. Suri says that this "ad hoe" application of the cultural defense is
unsatisfactory because if the information is admitted, there is no standard by which it should be
treated for evaluative purposes. The more disturbing problem with the system is the inconsistent
positions ofjudges as to whether to allow the evidence in at the trial stage. Today, it seems like
a lottery where, depending on which judge an immigrant defendant draws, the defendant has a
chance of hitting the jackpot and being allowed to present a cultural defense. Id.
123 Women and children are the two groups who need the most protection. See supra Part
M.B.
124 In the current system, some judges have no problem allowing a cultural defense to
protect a defendant, even if it does not fall within the rules of evidence. For example, in People
v. Chen, the judge allowed the cultural defense to play a crucial role in the outcome of Chen's
case. See Spatz, supra note 2, at 622 (discussing Judge Edward K. Pincus's observations
regarding Chen's heritage). Conversely, other judges refuse to admit evidence of a defendant's
cultural circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Kills Crow, 527 F.2d 158, 160 (8th Cir. 1975)
(upholding trial court decision not to allow cultural evidence).
125 See Gomez, supra note 53; Matsumoto, supra note 35. There is significant variation in
the sentencing schemes of different jurisdictions.
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judge or jury should then be allowed to consider the individual defendant's
cultural factors to mitigate the sentence.1
26
Using cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in the determination of a
defendant's sentence, instead of in the determination of his guilt, would ensure
that a defendant would be convicted of the crime he actually committed and not a
diluted version of the offense. 127 So a defendant charged with first-degree murder
would not be found guilty of only second-degree manslaughter solely because
cultural circumstances, not typically admissible under the rules of evidence, were
considered at the irial stage. During the sentencing stage, however, the defendant
could attempt to reduce the sentence by using the cultural circumstances
surrounding his actions. 28 This would lead to a positive result because it keeps
In some states, sentencing is committed to the unfettered discretion of the sentencing judge or
jury, as long as the judge sentences within the statutory range. In other states, voluntary
sentencing guidelines guide the sentencing judge's discretion. Finally, in the federal courts, and
some states, mandatory sentencing guidelines govem the judge's sentencing decision.
CONNELL& VALLADARES, supra note 25, at 12-1.
126 Some scholars feel that completely removing cultural factors from the courtroom would
essentially be saying that non-immigrant Americans have no culture. Leti Volpp commented
that keeping culture out of the courtroom would be "falling into the paradigm of "the 'West' as
somehow 'neutral' and 'standard."' Volpp, supra note 6, at 81.
127See Cardillo, supra note 15, at 92 (discussing Chen's watered down conviction).
128 Professor Gomez suggests a three-part framework that is triggered by a threshold
inquiry:.
As a threshold issue, the sentencing judge should consider whether the defendant's race or
cultural background was a significant factor in the act. If so, the judge should focus first, on the
offender's action, second, on the offender's culpability, and third, on the form(s) and severity of
sanctions that would best serve the goals of sentencing as expressed by the offender's cultural
community.
Gomez, supra note 53, at 368.
Professor Gomez's threshold inquiry and first two factors, which consider the defendant's
actions and culpability, seem sensible and appropriate. However, his third factor, which requires
a judge to look at the type of sanctions that best serve the sentencing goals of the defendant's
cultural community, seems inconsistent with the purpose of using cultural factors solely for
mitigation purposes. The mitigating factors that allow judges to downwardly depart from the
sentencing guidelines are in place to provide a basis for equitable sentencing, while still taking
into consideration a defendant's individual circumstances. Professor Gomez's third question
seems to shift the focus from the individual defendant back to how his cultural community
would consider sentencing him. This is dangerous because of the difficulty of identifying
"culture." See supra Part IV.C. Additionally, the primary advantage of evaluating cultural
circumstances in the sentencing phase is that it allows the sentencing judge orjury to get a more
complete picture of who the individual defendant is and why he may have committed the crime.
While it may be somewhat helpful for a judge to consider how serious the defendant's
actions are in relation to others in his native culture, ajudge could use several other questions to
help make a determination as to whether a reduction of the defendant's sentence is appropriate.
How serious was the crime? Were others injured by the defendant's crime? What is the
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the assessment of guilt or innocence accurate, while still accounting for the
defendant's cultural circumstances. 29
likelihood that the defendant might commit the same act again? -How long has the defendant
been in the United States? If the defendant has been in the United States for a significant
amount of time, were there any factors (such as severe isolation) that may explain why the
defendant should have his charges reduced? How well established in his native culture is the
cultural practice that the defendant is using to reduce his sentence?
129 Whether a defendant can use cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in sentencing
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is based largely on the ju'dge's interpretation of those
guidelines. See CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 12.3[b], at 12-14; Matsumoto,
supra note 35, at 533 (arguing that "the current state of the federol sentencing guidelines leads
to uneven application and varied results"). 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) authorizes the court, when
determining sentences, to consider any information about the defendant's background,
character, and conduct. THoMAs W. HuTcHIsoN ET AL., FED14RAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE § IB1.4, at 108 cmt.2 (2001). The Federal Sentencing Cuidelines are intended to be
used by the sentencing courts only as a basis for how the typical case should be sentenced.
"When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies
but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a
departure is warranted." UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANuAL 6 (2000) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
Two types of departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are permitted, those
specifically mentioned and those unguided departures not specifically mentioned. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES at 7. The cultural defense exception falls within the latter category. "The decision
as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted rests with the sentencing court on a
case-specific basis." Id. § 5K2.0, at 373. Aside from race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
and socio-economic status, all other factors "may warrant departure from the guidelines, under
some circumstances, in the discretion of the sentencing court." Id. Furthermore:
[A]n offender characteristic or other circumstance that is, in the Commission's view, "not
ordinarily relevant" in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range may be relevant to this determination if such characteristic or circumstance is
present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the "heartland" cases covered by
the guidelines.
Id. at 374; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). Koon states:
Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it
to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline. To resolve this question, the district court
must make a refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its
vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing.
Id. The Second Circuit observed that Koon imposes a "deferential standard of review," with the
appellate court being "generally obliged to defer to a sentence imposed in district court, in light
of that court's special competence regarding the exceptional circumstances present in a
sentencing case." United States v. Galante, 11 F.3d 1029, 1036 (2d Cir. 1997).
The next critical question the sentencing judge faces is whether the defendant's specific
cultural circumstances are disallowed, as a means to mitigate the sentence, because they classify
as either race or national origin. See CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 12.3[b], at 12-
14. "The federal courts have dealt with the issue of departing based on a defendant's cultural
background in a variety of ways." Id. Some courts have refused to recognize the possibility of
mitigation based on a defendant's cultural background because they consider it to fall under the
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Judicial recognition of the proposal that cultural factors should not be
considered at the trial phase, but should be examined in the sentencing phase, is
found in Illinois v. Galicia!" In this case, Galicia was charged with murdering
his girlfriend by stabbing her forty-four times with a six-inch steak knife.1
3 1
Galicia, a Mexican immigrant, claimed he murdered her because "she was a spell-
casting witch."'3 2 Pretrial attempts to use a cultural defense were thwarted when
the judge refused to admit expert testimony by a Professor of Intracultural
Psychology regarding the cultural beliefs about witchcraft of those in the area of
Mexico where Galicia was raised. 33 The judge also refused to admit into
evidence a letter that Galicia had received from his aunt warning him that the
victim was an evil witch. 34 In making her decision, the judge said that such
category of"race' or "national origin." Id. at 12-17; see United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d
391, 393 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prohibit the
consideration of cultural factors in sentencing). Some courts have allowed a defendant's
cultural circumstances to come in by "intermix[ing] the defendant's cultural background with
other factors." CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 123b), at 12-14; see, e.g., United
States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1332 (8th Cir. 1990). In Big Crow, the court "seemingly
equat[ed] the defendant's circumstances to that of the 'not relevant' factors of 'race' and
'socioeconomic status' in downwardly departing from the Guidelines and reducing the
defendant's sentence." CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 12.3[b], at 12-14 (quoting
Big Crow, 898 F.2d at 1332 n3). In doing this, the Eighth Circuit observed that the phrase "are
not relevant" may be too sweeping. Big Crow, 898 F.2d at 1332 n.3. Other courts have
expressly looked at a defendant's culture in their decision to downwardly depart from a
sentence. CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 12.3[b], at 12-15. In United States v.
Milagros Baez, No. 1:93CR0044-18 (N.D. Ohio August 4, 1993), the court allowed a
downward departure in the defendant's sentence for a money laundering conviction because the
court found that the defendant's ethnic and cultural peculiarities involving her willingness to
please her husband forced her to act under duress. CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 25,
§ 12.3[b), at 12-15 &n.62 (discussing Milagros Baez).
For a general discussion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see CONNELL &
VALLADARS, supra note 25, §§ 12.2-12.3. For a discussion about modifying the existing
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Matsumoto, supra note 35, at 531-34. Matsumoto argues
that a new guideline should be adopted that "addresses the factor of culture as relevant in the
determination of a sentence." Ida at 533.
130 659 N.E.2d 398 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (remanding for resentencing because the trial judge
considered an improper aggravating factor at the sentencing hearing). For a discussion of the
trial judge's decision to exclude evidence of the defendant's belief in witchcraft, see Adrienne
Drell, Witchcraft Murder Defense Fails: Judge Bars Expert Testimony on Defendant's Belief in
Victim's Supernatural Powers, 79 A.B.A. J. May 1993, at 40.
131Drell, supra note 130, at 40.
132 Id Galicia's defense attorney said that Galicia firmly believed the victim was "a bruja,
or female witch, in Mexican folklore, who had cast an embrujada, or spell, over him." 1d.
Galicia and his family were from a part of Mexico where such folklore and witchcraft were
widely believed. Galicia said that he was unable to find a "healer" to get rid of the spell and he
became so enraged that he was "propelled into this murderous act." Id.
13 31d.
134id.
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evidence was irrelevant in the trial phase and more appropriate for sentencing. 35
Cultural circumstances should be recognized as a mitigating factor in
sentencing, but should not be used to completely exonerate a defendant because
when a defendant is completely exonerated, or even if he is convicted of a lesser
crime because of a stand-alone cultural defense, justice is not served.
A. Using the Cultural Circumstances as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing
Will Placate Proponents and Opponents of the Defense.
Instituting a cultural defense that is limited to the sentencing phase of
prosecution will satisfy both those in favor of and those against officially
recognizing a cultural defense in the trial phase. The next two sections will show
that allowing cultural circumstances to be used as a mitigating factor in
sentencing appeases many of the concerns scholars have with instituting a cultural
defense in the trial phase and that instituting a cultural defense as a mitigating
factor will still produce many of the same benefits that proponents of instituting a
cultural defense at the trial stage consider so vital.
1. Allowing Cultural Circumstances to be Used Only as a Mitigating
Factor in Sentencing Corrects Many of the Concerns About a Full-
Fledged Cultural Defense.
Criticisms of allowing a cultural defense at the trial stage are largely
remedied if the cultural defense is considered as a mitigating factor only in
sentencing.
a. Women and Children Would be Protected
Cultural circumstances, limited to consideration at the sentencing stage,
would help protect the rights of women and children. Many of the crimes in
which a cultural defense would be used involve violence against women or
children. The adoption of such a defense at the trial phase would only perpetuate
the acceptance of violence, because' a cultural defense might protect from
135Id. As a result, Galicia was convicted of first-degree murder. Id.; see also United States
v. Ezeiruka, Crim. A. No. 94-42 (JE), 1995 WL 263983, at *5-*6 (D.N.J. May 3, 1995)
(permitting evidence of culture during the sentencing stage of trial); United States v. Carbonell,
737 F. Supp. 186, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (relying on cultural evidence to reduce the defendant's
sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute). But see United States v. Yu, 954
F.2d 951, 954 (3d Cir. 1992) (refusing to consider cultural circumstances to reduce a Korean
American defendant's sentence because he had lived in the United States for twelve years and
was a naturalized citizen); United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prohibit the consideration of cultural factors in
sentencing).
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conviction one who has committed an offense against a female or child. 136 By
allowing the cultural defense only during the sentencing stage, the defendant
would still be convicted of the crime he committed. Thus, he would be
appropriately blamed.137 It is especially important that immigrant women and
children receive protection because they are new to the country and often face
obstacles, such as language barriers, that keep them from being able to protect
themselves.1 38 Additionally, these victims may not be as likely to speak up for
themselves because their native culture may have viewed women and children as
subservient to men. 139 Evaluating cultural circumstances only at sentencing, and
not during trial, would show that the American legal system will not accept the
cultural excuses of individuals who commit crimes. For instance, in the Chen
case, one of the biggest concerns raised by immigrant-Asian women was that by
convicting Chen of only second-degree manslaughter and giving him only five
years probation, the court was setting a horrible precedent that abusive Asian men
in the community might follow 14 -- that in America their cultural background
allows them to abuse, beat, and even murder their wives.'4 1 If a court could only
136 Goldstein, supra note 1, at 162-63 ("[A] recognition of the cultural defense would
demonstrate that the United States tacitly consents to the violence toward women [and children]
that is practiced throughout the world.'); Talbot, supra note 24, at 2 (noting that the cultural
defense "is inconsistent... with one of the law's most fundamental objectives, the protection of
society and all of its members from harm").
7 This would help satisfy opponents of the traditional cultural defense who disapprove of
the fact that information of a defendant's culture may lead to significantly reduced charges or
even a complete acquittal. Here, if the defendant were convicted of the crime, a message would
be sent to members of the community that the act committed by the defendant was against the
law. Furthermore, while the defendant could have his sentence reduced when the judge
considers cultural circumstances, it would be in the judge's power not to reduce the defendant's
sentence if he believed the defendant was trying to use his cultural circumstances as a "free
pass" to commit illegal acts.
138 Wang, supra note 88, at 162. The inability to speak English has plagued many
immigrant women in domestic abuse situations. Because of the language barrier, the women
may not even know that the abuse is illegal. Furthermore, even if they do know the abuse is
unlawful their inability to communicate prevents them from getting help because almost all of
the domestic violence services target English-speaking victims. Id. at 163.
'
39Id. at 168 (explaining how many Asian communities strongly value the family and
often treat women as subordinates); Cardillo, supra note 15, at 88-90 (describing the traditional
role of women in Chinese society and the recent rise in violence against women in Chinese
communities).
40 The fact that Chen was convicted of only manslaughter is even more appalling when
the five years of probation he received is compared to the fifteen to twenty-five year sentence
he could have received had he been convicted of second-degree murder, which is a class A-1
felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1998); id. § 70.00(3)(a)(i); see Cardillo, supra
note 15, at 92-96.
141 After Chen, many Asian women were rightfully upset that their spouse's violence
towards them could be ignored simply because of the culture in their homelands. Goldstein,
supra note 1, at 162.
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review cultural circumstances at sentencing, Chen probably would have been
convicted of second-degree murder.142 This would have sent the message that it is
unacceptable in the United States, regardless of whether you are an immigrant, for
a husband to injure or kill his wife.43
b. No Need for a Bright Line Rule
Using cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in sentencing resolves the
problem surrounding the impossibility of implementing a bright line rule. As
explained above,' 44 it is nearly impossible for legislatures to devise a statute that
satisfactorily specifies how to define a culture, to whom the cultural defense
should apply, and for what duration of time the cultural defense should apply.
Examining cultural circumstances in the sentencing phase removes the necessity
of a bright-line test by allowing courts to look separately at every individual. A
court's consideration of cultural circumstances as mitigating factors in the
sentencing phase is no different than its consideration of any of the other factors
that it is currently permitted to examine when departing from a recommended
sentence.
145
c. Balkanization Would Be Prevented
Considering cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor would prevent the
potential balkanization of the American criminal justice system that could result
from allowing the cultural defense.146 For instance, some fear there would be a
separate legal system for each cultural background. 47 Additionally, using a
defendant's cultural circumstances in the sentencing stage does not present the
equal protection problems that are implicit in the trial-phase cultural defense. The
risk of equal protection problems is diminished because there will not be a
separate legal system for every cultural group and the law will apply equally to
every defendant. The defendant's cultural background would arise only during the
14 2 Kim argues that the minimum Chen should have received is manslaughter in the first
degree because there was no evidence supporting a finding of recklessness. Kim, supra note 2,
at 121.
143 While this message would be sent, Chen still may have received a reduced sentence
because cultural circumstances would have been considered.
14See supra Part III.C.
145 Some factors that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines permit courts to use to depart from
a suggested recommended sentence include: the extreme conduct of the victim, whether the
crime was committed to avoid a perceived greater harm, whether the defendant was under
coercion or duress, and whether the defendant suffered from some sort of diminished capacity
when he committed the offense. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 130, §§ 5K2.11-5K2.13,
at 378-79.
146 Coleman, supra note 99, at 1098; see supra Part IV.D.
147 Coleman, supra note 99, at 1098.
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sentencing phase 141 to permit an evaluation of the appropriate sentence.
Furthermore, complete balkanization would not occur if the defendant's cultural
circumstances were admitted only in sentencing 149 because the structure of
sentencing would still be based only upon each individual's characteristics-not
the characteristics of his culture.
d. Stereotyping Would Be Reduced
If cultural factors were introduced during the trial phase, the defendant would
be evaluated against the standard of what a reasonable person from that culture
would do. These generalizations could negatively impact other members of the
defendant's culture, especially if the assumptions were derogatory or
inaccurate. 150 Adopting the cultural defense as a mitigating factor would lessen
the occurrence of negative stereotyping against immigrant groups and racial
minorities. A judge would be able to use any cultural information as it applies to
that specific individual, rather than relying on stereotypes about how a typical
person in the defendant's culture would act.1 5'
48 Allowing a trial-phase cultural defense might cause a separate set of legal rules for
immigrant defendants because an immigrant defendant might not always be convicted of the
crimes of which a non-immigrant defendant would be convicted. But using the defendant's
cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in sentencing ensures that the cultural factors that
may have influenced his actions would only be considered after a determination of guilt.
Therefore, an immigrant defendant stands the same chance of being found guilty of the crime as
a non-immigrant defendant. It is only after an immigrant defendant is found guilty that he could
attempt to admit cultural circumstances in an effort to have his sentence reduced. As a result,
using a defendant's cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in sentencing maintains
consistent legal rules for all individuals.
149Of course, cultural circumstances properly admitted under the Federal Rules of
Evidence would still be heard during the trial phase.
150 dm, supra note 2, at 125. Kim believes that there is "a real possibility that cultural
evidence will further racist stereotypes." Id. She does not think, however, that all cultural
evidence should be kept out of trial. Instead, she believes courts should "scrutinize the evidence
being presented to ensure that it accurately reflects the culture from which it is purported to
originate." Id. This suggestion creates an unworkable framework because of the difficulty of
defining and identifying characteristics of culture.
"' Volpp, supra note 6, at 100.
Information about the defendant's culture should never be reduced to stereotypes about a
community but rather should concretely address the individual defendant's location in her
community, her location in the diaspora and her history. The information should be provided so
as to give insight into an individual's thoughts, and should not be used for purposes of
explaining how an individual fits into stereotypes of group behavior.
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
2. Allowing the Cultural Defense to Be Used As a Mitigating Factor in
Sentencing Preserves Many of the Benefits Offered by Proponents of a
Full-Fledged Cultural Defense.
Instituting standards to accept cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor
will correct many of the problems that come from a trial-level cultural defense.
a. Retention ofIndividualized Justice
Perhaps the greatest benefit that would result from allowing cultural
circumstances as a mitigating factor in sentencing is that it would retain the basic
principles of fairness and individualized justice that a trial-phase cultural defense
offers.' 52 Considering the cultural circumstances surrounding every individual
defendant at the sentencing stage serves to exact the individualized justice that is a
foundational principle of our criminal justice system. 53 Doing so would allow the
judge to tailor the defendant's punishment to his or her specific circumstances.1 54
Such a structure is beneficial because, unlike the current situation where cultural
circumstances may generally be ignored, a convicted defendant has a chance to
explain her cultural circumstances to the judge or jury prior to the decision on her
sentence.
b. Deterrence Will Be Maintained
One of the primary roles of sentencing is to deter both the defendant and
152 Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1298. The trial-phase cultural defense benefits the
defendant, but ignores the victim because it allows the crime committed by the defendant to go
unpunished. Such a result essentially declares the defendant innocent. Using the defendant's
circumstances in the sentencing stage benefits the defendant and protects the victim. It helps the
victim because the defendant is convicted of the illegal act, thereby showing that the criminal
justice system does not approve of the behavior. Likewise, it benefits the defendant because it
allows him an opportunity to present his cultural circumstances to the judge or jury for a
possible reduction in sentence. Assuming the judge or jury finds this evidence compelling, a
defendant is protected from receiving the full brunt of the recommended sentence. See
CONNELL& VALLADARES, supra note 25, § 7.7, at 7-42 to 7-43.
153 This would be consistent with the trend towards more individualized justice present in
criminal justice for the past two decades. See Coleman, supra note 99, at 1114-18. Deborah M.
Boulette Taylor found that while it may be arguable that "the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
marked a shift away from individualized sentencing, criminal defendants are generally afforded
a subjective evaluation of their conduct in the sentencing phase of their prosecution." Boulette
Taylor, supra note 49, at 449. "In enacting the [Federal Sentencing Guidelines], Congress
sought to achieve three primary sentencing goals: honesty, uniformity, and proportionality."
United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962,963 (1st Cir. 1989).
154 Cultural Defense, supra note 24, at 1297.
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others from committing the crime in the future.' The nature of many crimes
motivated by cultural factors is such that deterrence is of little value because a
defendant who commits such a crime is either motivated by a flash of passion or a
desperate feeling that there is no alternative. 5 6 In these situations, no amount of
potential punishment would keep the defendant from committing the criminal act.
Thus, allowing the defendant's cultural factors to potentially mitigate his sentence
would neither induce nor dissuade the defendant from committing the crime.
In addition, others in the defendant's culture-class may feel that they can get
away with the same act because a defendant has the chance of being convicted of
a lesser charge (or even having the charge dropped) when he raises a cultural
defense in the trial phase.'5 7 Thus, recognition of the cultural defense at the trial
stage may encourage abuse of the cultural defense." 8 If cultural circumstances are
considered only during sentencing, however, the assessment of guilt will occur
before these circumstances are considered. Because a defendant may still be
found guilty, regardless of the cultural circumstances, the members of the
defendant's community will not be able to improperly use their culture to avoid
assessment of blame. Therefore, potential defendants will be deterred because
there will be no possibility that their cultural factors will completely exonerate
them.
c. Improved Accuracy of Cases
The cultural defense, limited to recognition as a mitigating factor only in the
sentencing stage, would provide the same results as would occur by using the
cultural defense in the trial phase. If the defendant knows that a judge will
consider his cultural circumstances when determining a sentence, he will be more
likely to defend the act as it happened and less likely to explain away his behavior
by forcing his actions into some other inapplicable standard defense-such as
insanity or self-defense. 59 Therefore, the court will reach the most appropriate
resolution of the case to ensure that the law is applied properly and equitably
155 Kim, supra note 2, at 103.
',
6Kimura, a case in which the defendant murdered her child and fully intended to commit
suicide, provides an example in which the threat of punishment was a useless deterrent because
of the defendant's moral and social compulsion to kill her children. Kim, supra note 2, at
117-19 (discussing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985)).
1-7For instance in People v. Chen, Chen's charges were reduced from second-degree
murder to second-degree manslaughter. Schuyler, supra note 10, at 27; see also Talbot, supra
note 3, at 18; Terry, supra note 3, atA10.
"' Kim, supra note 2, at 135 ("Permitting evidence on a cultural practice, [deemed illegal
in the United States], might send a message to others in the defendant's community that
observing the practice will not be punished.").
159Of course, this argument may be naive. A good argument can be made that a properly
represented defendant will use any strategy ethically allowable.
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against the defendant. 160
B. The Application of the Cultural Defense to Case Law
This section considers how some of the cases mentioned in this note might
have been decided had the respective legislatures recognized cultural
circumstances as a mitigating factor during the sentencing phase. Additionally,
this section will perform the same analysis on an incident recently reported in the
news. The cases considered in this section are People v. Chen,161 the Iraqi
marriage example from the introduction, 162 and California v. Verk,163 a case yet tQ
be heard.
1. People v. Chen
In People v. Chen, Chen killed his wife and, because a judge allowed him to
introduce during the trial phase evidence barred by the Rules of Evidence,' 64 his
original charge of second-degree murder was reduced to second-degree
manslaughter. 16 Had the New York State legislature recognized cultural
circumstances as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of Chen's trial, the
results may have been different. For instance, if the judge had not been permitted
to consider cultural factors during the trial phase, but still had the ability to control
Chen's sentence by evaluating his culture as a mitigating factor in the sentencing
phase, the judge may not have reduced Chen's original charge of second-degree
murder to second-degree manslaughter. This is important because Chen would
have been convicted of the crime he actually committed, and it may have quelled
much of the outrage regarding Chen being convicted of second-degree
manslaughter rather than second-degree murder.
166
160 If a defendant successfully uses an inapplicable defense because he feels he has no
other legal justification for his actions, the court would not be applying the law as the legislature
intended.
161 Spatz, supra note 1, at 621 n.169 (citing People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 21, 1989)).
162 See Talbot, supra note 3, at 18; Terry, supra note 3, at A10.
'
63 All Things Considered: Cultural Defense for Murder (National Public Radio broadcast,
Aug. 21, 2000), available at http://www.npr.org [hereinafter All Things Considered].
'64 No state, including New York, officially recognizes the cultural defense at any stage in
criminal trials. Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 23, at 19. However, the Chen court, like
other courts across the country, admitted a substantial amount of evidence about Chen's cultural
background and beliefs. Therefore, the evidence resulted in an "unofficial" cultural defense.
Kim, supra note 2, at 121.
165 Kim, supra note 2, at 120. Chen was sentenced to only five years probation. Id.
166 Jetter, supra note 8, at 5.
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2. The Iraqi Marriage Case
In the Iraqi case,167 discussed earlier in this note, two men who married
young girls and then consummated their respective marriages were charged with
statutory rape.168 Under current Nebraska law, both men would be unable to
introduce their cultural circumstances into evidence during the trial stage or the
sentencing stage of their trials, unless permitted by the Nebraska Rules of
Evidence. 69 As a result, both men would likely be convicted of statutory rape and
could be sentenced to up to fifty years in prison.' 70 This result seems harsh
considering the special cultural facts that the men only recently arrived in the
country, that they lived in an isolated predominantly Iraqi community, and that
marrying girls this young is widely accepted in Iraq. Because there was no
recognized cultural defense available to the men, either in the trial phase or the
sentencing stage, the court would likely find them guilty and sentence them
without considering this information.'
7 1
If Nebraska adopted a trial-stage cultural defense, both men would be entitled
to introduce at their trials the facts that they were new to the United States, that
they lived in an isolated Iraqi community in Nebraska, and that it is acceptable in
Iraqi culture for men to marry young girls.' 72 Upon hearing this, the judge or jury
might have either dismissed the charges completely or reduced them to a lesser
charge, such as sexual assault of a child.' 73 This may have sent a message that
167See Schuyler, supra note 3, at 27; Talbot, supra note 3.
16 8 Schuyler, supra note 3, at 27.
169Nebraska, along with all other states, has no stand-alone cultural defense available to
defendants.
'70 Sexual penetration is sexual assault in the first degree, a Class II felony when the actor
is nineteen years of age or older and the victim is less than sixteen years of age. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-319 (1995). A Class II felony carries a maximum sentence of fifty years in prison.
Id. § 28-105; see Schuyler, supra note 3, at 27.
1 Of course, the court could have followed other courts throughout the country by
allowing the cultural evidence at trial, thereby permitting the defendants to have a quasi-cultural
defense. If this occurred, the men probably would have had their cases dismissed, or their
charges reduced. See, e.g., Maine v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 84 (Me. 1996) (holding that Afghan
custom should be taken into account when sexual assault is charged).
'
7 2 The defense could introduce this through the testimony of an expert witness who is
familiar with the cultural climate of Iraq. See Kim, supra note 2, at 123. Kim explains that
according to the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert must have specific knowledge of the
defendant's culture superior to that of an ordinary juror. Id. In Chen, the defense called a
cultural anthropologist as an expert witness. He testified, "that traditional Chinese values
regarding adultery and loss of manhood made [Chen] violent." Gibeaut, supra note 6, at 93; see
also Leti Volpp, supra note 6, at 66-67 (examining the expert witness testimony in Chen).
173 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-320.01 (Supp. 2000). Sexual assault of a child is a Class HIA
felony. Id. Class liA felonies carry a maximum sentence of "five years imprisonment, or ten
thousand dollars fine, or both." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105 (1995). There is no minimum
sentence. Id. Having the charge reduced to a Class IIiA felony results in a much less severe
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statutory rape, a serious crime, is acceptable, or at least not as bad, if you are an
immigrant defendant.
If Nebraska had permitted cultural factors to be considered as a mitigating
factor during the sentencing phase of the trial, the men probably still would have
been convicted of statutory rape.' 74 The judge would have been allowed to
examine cultural factors that affected the defendants' actions, however, and
reduce their sentences accordingly. 75 If the Iraqi men were simply ignorant of the
statutory rape laws in America,176 while they would be convicted of the crime
they committed, the judge would have the discretion to considerably reduce the
men's sentences. This is the most equitable result for both the defendants and the
victims.
3. California v. Verk
A recent news program reported that a woman living in California was
charged with two counts of attempted murder for trying to kill her two children.1
77
Narindar Verk, a native of India, immigrated to the United States nearly eight
years ago.178 She is accused of trying to drown her children by holding their heads
under water.179 The thirty-nine-year-old immigrant claims that she has never
understood American values or laws and that she was simply trying to save her
children from the shame they would feel as a result of her husband filing for
divorce.180 According to Verk, under her cultural views, she bears complete
responsibility for the failed marriage, and the shame of the divorce would have
devastated her children and closed the doors to family and friends. 8'
While this case has not yet been decided, it can be compared with People v.
penalg than the original fifty-year maximum penalty.4 This seems likely because the men satisfied each of the elements of the crime: the men
were over the age of eighteen, the girls were under the age of fourteen, and the couples had
intercourse. Talbot, supra note 3; see Bennett v. State, 196 N.W. 905, 906 (Neb. 1924)
(explaining that the carnal knowledge of a female person under the age of fifteen is rape,
regardless of her consent as long as the actor is older than eighteen); Witty v. State, 181 N.W.
164, 166 (Neb. 1920) (explaining that in the prosecution for the sexual assault of a girl under
the age of fifteen, it is immaterial whether the girl consented).
'
75 Some factors the judge might have considered include: how long the men had been in
country, how isolated the Iraqi community was from mainstream America, how prevalent was
the practice of marrying so young in Iraq, whether anyone was harmed as a result of the crime,
and whether the girls truly consented to the marriages.
176This also requires the presumption that there was no possibility that the girls were
unwilling participants in the marriage.
177 Al Things Considered, supra note 165.
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Kimura.'12 The two cases are similar in that both women tried to kill their
children after learning that their husbands were going to leave them.'
8 3
Unfortunately for the Kimura children, their mother succeeded. In both cases, the
women claimed that they had to commit murder to save their children from the
horrors that divorce would bring. Verk does not yet know whether the judge will
allow her to introduce evidence of her cultural beliefs, a tactic that was so
successful for Kimura.
If the California legislature had adopted the use of cultural circumstances as a
mitigating factor in sentencing and the court had applied it at Verk's trial, the
results of her case would probably be much different than Kimura's. First, no
evidence of her cultural circumstances, other than that permitted under the
California Rules of Evidence, would be allowed at trial, and the jury would be
forced to look at the facts presented by both sides regarding whether Verk
committed the act. Second, if found guilty, Verk would be able to present
evidence of her cultural circumstances at the sentencing phase. In this case, if the
judge finds her cultural circumstances relevant,8 4 he could use his discretion to
reduce the sentence accordingly.
By using her cultural circumstances only in sentencing, it is conceivable that
Verk could get her sentence reduced as drastically as Kimura. However, a
reduction coming only after the verdict does have positive effects. Perhaps the
greatest benefit is that she still would be found guilty of attempted murder. s8
Regardless of the sentence, a conviction would make it clear that Verk committed
attempted nurder-something forbidden by the American legal system despite
immigrant status.'8 6 This would serve to protect the interests of children and
create a different effect by sending a message that these actions are illegal.'
8 7
t82 See supra note 33.
183 Additionally, both incidents occurred in California. See id; All Things Considered,
supra note 165.
84 While the length of time (nearly eight years) that Verk has lived in the United States
seems to work against her, the judge would also consider things such as how isolated she is
from the rest of her community and whether her actions are widely accepted and practiced in
her homeland.
1s Refusing to admit evidence on a practice that harms others "sends a clear message that
the behavior is unacceptable in this society." Kim, supra note 2, at 136.
116Placido Gomez argues that the sentence a convicted person receives shapes "Public
assessment concerning the legitimacy of our criminal justice system." Gomez, supra note 53, at
358. The stigma that attaches when someone is convicted of murder or some other crime seems
far stronger than any length of sentence. If a person was convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to three years in prison for her crime, when she is free people will believe that she did
not commit murder. But if that same person were convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to three years in prison, she would have to live forever with the stigma of being a
murderer.
187 In addition, a message would be sent that, under the American legal system, immigrant
Indian children receive the same protections as all other Americans. See supra notes 136-44
and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, the defendant, Verk, would also benefit from having her cultural
factors examined in the sentencing stage because she would have a chance to
explain her circumstances and be sentenced accordingly. This outcome is much
fairer to her than the current system in which her cultural circumstances are
supposed to be ignored-though some judges deviate from this rule.
These cases illustrate that allowing cultural circumstances as a mitigating
factor in the sentencing phase offers advantages over both the current system,
which does not permit a cultural defense, and a proposed trial-phase cultural
defense. Therefore, legislatures should permit a defendant's cultural
circumstances to be used as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current judicial practice of refusing to formally recognize a cultural
defense is inadequate. Because some judges ignore the fact that there is no
formally recognized defense and allow otherwise inadmissible cultural
information into trials, some defendants receive preferential treatment that other
defendants do not receive. On the other hand, creating a stand-alone cultural
defense is problematic because it may be unevenly applied, it may promote
stereotypes, and it may serve to undermine the rights of immigrant women and
children. Additionally, instituting a formal stand-alone cultural defense in the trial
phase is unacceptable because it is impossible for the legislature to draft
legislation that defines when, where, and how the defense can be used.
Recognition of cultural circumstances as a mitigating factor in sentencing retains
the benefits of a trial-phase cultural defense, while eliminating the drawbacks. It
allows defendants to be treated equally and fairly, while preserving the victim's
rights and conveying the message that courts forbid immigrants' illegal behavior.
Therefore, jurisdictions should recognize cultural circumstances as a mitigating
factor in sentencing.
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